Mind as a Physical Force: Popper’s Metaphysical Hypothesis (notice n° 575451)
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| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121134010.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Dolbeault, Joël |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Mind as a Physical Force: Popper’s Metaphysical Hypothesis |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2013.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 87 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | With respect to the mind-body relation, Popper rejects physicalism, as defined by the principle of the causal closure of the physical world, and attempts to build an interactionist hypothesis that would agree with the findings of contemporary science. More precisely, Popper criticizes the most elaborate forms of physicalism because they run counter to evolutionary theory and rationalism. By contrast, he thinks that the interactionist hypothesis can find support in a minute comparison of mind and physical forces. This comparison tends to draw Popper closer together with panpsychism. |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger | Volume 138 | 4 | 2013-11-06 | p. 505-526 | 0035-3833 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-philosophique-2013-4-page-505?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-philosophique-2013-4-page-505?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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