Why do local institutions matter? The political economics of decentralisation (notice n° 577262)

détails MARC
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fixed length control field 01777cam a2200157 4500500
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20250121134732.0
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title fre
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE
Authentication code dc
100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Colombo, Andrea
Relator term author
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Why do local institutions matter? The political economics of decentralisation
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2020.<br/>
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE
General note 79
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. In the last decades, decentralization reforms have often come to the fore of the policy debate in both OECD and non-OECD countries. In spite of the many theorised virtues, these reforms might fail to deliver when local institutions are too weak to guarantee higher accountability of local policy-makers to constituents. To support this argument, this paper analyses the political economics of decentralization reforms in three countries (Burundi, Brazil and Belgium) that differ in terms of their stage of development as well as the “intensity” of their decentralized institutions. In unstable political settings—like those characterising post-conflict countries—, decentralization may fail if leaders exploit entrenched rivalries to weaken local institutions and compete unfairly for power. In more stable settings, decentralization may entail coordination costs that prevent local leaders to jointly provide a decentralized public service and even create incentives for free-riding. Local political dynamics may exacerbate these coordination costs, with collusion among politically aligned leaders blurring their accountability to citizens and leading to lower-quality public services.
786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY
Note Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique | Volume LVIII | 1 | 2020-07-02 | p. 115-130 | 0034-2971
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-reflets-et-perspectives-de-la-vie-economique-2020-1-page-115?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-reflets-et-perspectives-de-la-vie-economique-2020-1-page-115?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080</a>

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