Anti-dumping with heterogeneous firms (notice n° 594041)
[ vue normale ]
| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 02407cam a2200265 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250121150734.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Gormsen, Christian |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Anti-dumping with heterogeneous firms |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2011.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 63 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | RésuméCet article analyse les politiques antidumping dans un modèle à deux pays avec des firmes hétérogènes. À court terme, le pays qui mène une politique antidumping réduit la concurrence aux profits des firmes locales et au détriment des consommateurs nationaux. A long terme, une telle politique attire de nouvelles entreprises, conduisant à une augmentation de la concurrence et du bien être du consommateur. Dans le pays partenaire, la concurrence augmente initialement : certaines entreprises exportent, mais les autres diminuent leurs prix domestiques, ce qui est bénéfique pour les consommateurs à court terme. Cependant, à long terme, moins de firmes entrent sur le marché non-protégé, diminuant ainsi la concurrence, ce qui entraînent des pertes de bien-être.Classification JEL : F12 ; F13. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This paper analyzes antidumping (AD) policies in a two-country model with heterogeneous firms. One country enforces AD so harshly that firms exporting to the country choose not to dump. In the short run, the country enforcing AD experiences reduced competition to the benefit of local firm and detriment of local consumers, but in the long run AD protection attracts new firms, increasing competition and consumer welfare. In the country’s trading partner, competition initially increases: Some firms give up exporting, but those that remain will lower their domestic prices. Consumers therefore benefit in the short run. In the long run, however, fewer firms will enter the unprotected country, and competition will eventually decrease, resulting in welfare losses. JEL Classification: F12; F13. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | firmes hétérogènes |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | concurrence monopolistique |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | anti-dumping |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | politique commerciale |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | monopolistic competition |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | tradepolicy |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | heterogeneous firms |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | anti-dumping |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Économie internationale | 125 | 1 | 2011-12-01 | p. 41-64 | 1240-8093 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-economie-internationale-2011-1-page-41?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-economie-internationale-2011-1-page-41?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
Pas d'exemplaire disponible.
Réseaux sociaux