Dissuasion du crime et concurrence entre juridictions (notice n° 832693)
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| fixed length control field | 02045cam a2200253 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250123135618.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Marceau, Nicolas |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Dissuasion du crime et concurrence entre juridictions |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2002.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 85 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | RésuméDans ce texte, nous étudions la concurrence que se livrent des juridictions dans la dissuasion du crime. Nous envisageons un monde dans lequel les criminels peuvent choisir la juridiction dans laquelle ils œuvreront. Chaque juridiction, afin de protéger sa dotation, investit en dissuasion, ce qui réduit le rendement net du crime sur son territoire et repousse potentiellement les criminels vers l’autre juridiction. Nous caractérisons les divers équilibres, symétrique et asymétrique, qui peuvent exister dans ce monde. Nous montrons qu’en l’absence de coordination entre les juridictions, les seuls équilibres qui puissent être efficaces sont asymétriques. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | This paper studies competition in of crime deterrence between jurisdictions. It considers a world such that criminals can chose the jurisdiction in which they operate. To protect its allocation, every jurisdiction invests in deterrence to reduce benefits of criminal benefits on its territory and to incite criminals to locate in another jurisdiction. We characterize the different equilibria, symetric and asymetric, which can appear in such a world. We demonstrate that when there is no cooperation between jurisdictions, the only possible efficient equilibria are asymmetric.Classification du JEL: K42 |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | dissuasion |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | crime |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | concurrence entre juridictions |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | interjurisdictional competition |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | crime |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | deterrence |
| 700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Mongrain, Steeve |
| Relator term | author |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue d'économie politique | 112 | 6 | 2002-12-01 | p. 905-919 | 0373-2630 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2002-6-page-905?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2002-6-page-905?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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