Responsabilité, délégation, concurrence l'efficacité des organisations et des institutions (notice n° 832977)
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control field | 20250123135711.0 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
Authentication code | dc |
100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Boyer, Marcel |
Relator term | author |
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Responsabilité, délégation, concurrence l'efficacité des organisations et des institutions |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2005.<br/> |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | 76 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Jean-Jacques Laffont a beaucoup contribué à l’étude de l’efficacité relative des organisations et institutions responsables du développement et de l’implémentation des réformes dans le secteur public. Il a fait preuve en cette matière d’une détermination et d’une rigueur exemplaires dans la caractérisation des cadres institutionnels pertinents à comparer. Le présent article traite de trois de ces analyses à partir de Boyer et Laffont [1997,1999,2003]: les propriétés des règles efficaces de responsabilité étendue en protection de l’environnement, l’émergence de la réglementation incitative comme instrument d’implémentation dans une perspective d’économie politique constitutionnelle, et l’impact d’une concurrence accrue sur l’intensité des incitations dans un secteur public réglementé. |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Responsability, delegation, competition: the efficiency of organizations and institutions Jean-Jacques Laffont made numerous contributions to the study of the relative efficiency of organizations and institutions responsible for developing and implementing public policy reforms. In this endeavour, he continuously and repeatedly showed very high levels of determination and care to properly define and characterize the relevant institutional frameworks or instruments to be compared. This paper deals with three such analyses from Boyer and Laffont [1997,1999,2003]: the properties of efficient extended liability rules for environmental protection, the efficient emergence of incentive regulation as a policy implementation instrument in a constitutional political economy framework, and the impact of the development of competitive pressures on the intensity of incentives in the public regulated sector. |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | réglementation |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | institutions |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | incitations |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | regulation |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | incentives |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | institutions |
786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
Note | Revue d'économie politique | 115 | 3 | 2005-06-01 | p. 285-308 | 0373-2630 |
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2005-3-page-285?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2005-3-page-285?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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