Différer l'âge de départ en retraite les effets du cumul emploi-retraite (notice n° 833195)
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| fixed length control field | 04294cam a2200301 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250123135753.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Khaskhoussi, Fouad |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Différer l'âge de départ en retraite les effets du cumul emploi-retraite |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2006.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 49 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Les départs précoces à la retraite sont souvent expliqués par l’existence d’une taxe sur la prolongation d’activité. Actuellement, en France, le système de retraite par répartition ne fournit que de très faibles incitations financières à la poursuite d’activité au-delà du taux plein. En outre le vieillissement de la population accroît de façon dramatique la charge des retraites pour l’économie. Face à cette situation, une réforme du système de retraite est inévitable. Ce travail se propose de comparer à l’aide d’un modèle canonique, les effets de deux réformes du système de retraite. Une première, déjà évoquée dans plusieurs travaux récents, utilise les «surcotes » comme argument d’incitation. La deuxième, qui constitue l’apport majeur de ce travail, propose plutôt la réduction des taxes explicites, au-delà du taux plein, c’est à dire la mise en place d’un cumul emploiretraite. Cette comparaison permet de mettre en lumière les limites des «surcotes », qui dépendent de manière cruciale du taux d’escompte. Elle met aussi en évidence la supériorité de la deuxième politique qui permet d’aboutir à une meilleure conciliation entre l’équilibre des caisses de retraite et les règles de décision individuelle. Une autre ambition de ce travail est d’étudier l’optimum de second rang permettant de tenir compte des évolutions démographiques tout en préservant le système fiscal actuel. Une analyse en termes de courbe de Laffer permet de déterminer le profil optimal des taux de taxe. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Evaluating pension reforms the effects of combining work with pension receipt on individuals’retirement decision and financial viability of PAYG system As underlined by Gruber and Wise [1998], in many OCDE countries, social security provisions, especially defined pension plans, impose strong constraints on retirement decisions, which incite individuals to retire early. Combined with ageing, the early retirement seems to plague the financial viability of security systems. In response, governments such as France, Italy and Sweden have established pension reforms in order to encourage agents to work longer. Major recent studies on retirement often argue that additional pensions should be paid to individuals who work longer. Pension health then increases with continued work and compensates the worker for the lower life expectancy in case he postpones retirement. While there may be good reasons for such strategy, the economic consequences of this reform are not well understood. In this respect, this papers aims to better understand the effects of alternative pensions reforms on individuals’retirement decision and financial equilibrium of PAYG system. Our analysis yields strong argument in favor of a policy aimed at eliminating the explicit tax on continued work: decreasing the contribution rate for the elder workers can not only encourages individuals to delay retirement but also helps finance the expected deficit of PAYG system. Furthermore, this paper reveals that implementing incentives schemes should be accompanied by measures to increase job opportunities, including the elimination of measures and practices that impose strong limits on activity of older worker. This is particulary true for restrictions on combining receipt of pension and work income. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | courbe de Laffer |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | modèle à générations |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | retraite par répartition |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | vieillissement |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | taxation optimale |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | ageing |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | tax on continued work |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | pension reforms |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Laffer curve |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | pay-as-you-go system |
| 700 10 - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Khaskhoussi, Tarek |
| Relator term | author |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue d'économie politique | 116 | 5 | 2006-10-01 | p. 717-737 | 0373-2630 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2006-5-page-717?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2006-5-page-717?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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