Incitations managériales dans un duopole mixte : cas de la privatisation partielle de la firme publique (notice n° 833953)
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control field | 20250123140010.0 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
Authentication code | dc |
100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Ouattara Kadohognon, Sylvain |
Relator term | author |
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | Incitations managériales dans un duopole mixte : cas de la privatisation partielle de la firme publique |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2013.<br/> |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | 35 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Cet article étudie l’impact des schémas de rémunération managériaux dans un jeu où une firme publique, qui fait face à une situation de privatisation partielle de son capital, est en concurrence avec une firme privée. Le schéma de rémunération des gestionnaires de la firme partiellement privatisée est supposé tenir compte des objectifs sociaux de l’autorité publique. Il est alors démontré que l’utilisation stratégique de ces contrats incitatifs managériaux permet de contribuer à l’amélioration du bien-être social. De plus, la mise en œuvre de contrats incitatifs pour les gestionnaires peut avoir des effets concurrentiels similaires à ceux de la privatisation. |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | Managerial incentives in mixed duopoly: the case of partial privatization This paper studies the impact of managerial incentive contracts in a game where a firm that is owned jointly by both the private and public sectors (a semi-public firm) competes with a private firm. The incentive scheme of semi-public firm managers is assumed to reflect the social goals of public authority. It was found that the strategic use of managerial incentive contracts can contribute to improve social welfare. Furthermore, the use of incentive contracts may have similar competitive effects than those of privatization. |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Duopole mixte |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | privatisation partielle |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | incitations managériales |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | partial privatization |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | managerial incentives |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Mixed duopoly |
786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
Note | Revue d'économie politique | 123 | 4 | 2013-09-10 | p. 495-517 | 0373-2630 |
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2013-4-page-495?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-politique-2013-4-page-495?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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