Les contrats économiques de souveraineté, outils de la régulation de la concurrence (les pratiques des autorités de concurrence à partir de l'exemple de la France) (notice n° 874362)
[ vue normale ]
| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 06404cam a2200373 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250123160800.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Boy, Laurence |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Les contrats économiques de souveraineté, outils de la régulation de la concurrence (les pratiques des autorités de concurrence à partir de l'exemple de la France) |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2011.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 14 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Dans le cadre concurrentiel devenu mondial, concentration et organisation de l’économie résultent on ne peut plus clairement de deux facteurs : le jeu combiné des stratégies des acteurs privés et publics mais aussi les moyens proposés par le système juridique pour les accompagner et/ou les encadrer. Les procédures négociées illustrent la notion proposée par certains de contrat économique, en l’espèce, de contrat de souveraineté, outils de régulation de la concurrence. Ce texte propose une étude de droit économique de ces contrats de structuration et de restructuration du capital dans la régulation du droit de la concurrence. Les analyses conduisent à s’intéresser, au-delà des strictes obligations juridiques traditionnelles et détaillées souscrites par les entreprises, à l’équilibre général de l’accord, au but économique qu’il poursuit. Il s’agit, en effet, d’une convention globale formant un tout cohérent en dépit des dispositions diverses qu’elle peut contenir, ce qui explique en grande partie son régime juridique. En échange d’engagements pour rendre l’opération ou les comportements compatibles avec une concurrence praticable, autorités publiques et juges négocient dans ces contrats leur souveraineté. Même si la menace de sanction pèse toujours, contre une certaine indulgence, les entreprises s’engagent à respecter l’ordre public concurrentiel. On assiste ainsi substantiellement à une organisation conjointe et concertée de la concentration et du pouvoir économique, sous la houlette des fameuses Autorités administratives indépendantes, sous contrôle du juge. La souplesse caractéristique des engagements des entreprises s’accompagne corrélativement d’une vigilance dans le suivi des contrats économiques en droit de la concurrence. Le facteur temps est essentiel en droit économique. Dans les procédures négociées, les autorités de concurrence ont donc pris l’habitude de faire appel à des mandataires (trustees) pour suivre non seulement les engagements comportementaux mais aussi structurels qui, plus simples à exécuter a priori, soulèvent eux aussi de sérieuses difficultés, comme en témoignent des affaires récentes. L’efficacité et l’efficience des engagements tiennent sans doute à ce qui est à l’origine du contrat : la confiance et la réciprocité. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | ECONOMIC CONTRACTS OF SOVEREIGNTY AS COMPETITION REGULATION TOOLS (THE PRACTICE OF THE COMPETITION AUTHORITIES WITH FRANCE AS A CASE STUDY) In a globalized market economy, concentration and economic organization are the result of two combined elements : private economic power’s strategies and public policy instruments of competition law. Over the past decade, the US and the EU competition law have undergone a range of substantive reforms. A wave of reforms has just been passed. These reforms, which will significantly remould the institutional architecture of the competition systems around the world, cover areas such as the promotion of private enforcement, settlements and leniency procedures for hardcore infringements, commitment decisions, market inquiries and informal regulations. In order to promote competitive markets, leniency programs and commitments are the new regulatory instruments used by competition authorities. Instead of sanctions and fines, competition authorities and judges prefer to use various procedural mechanisms based on commitments in order to fight hardcore cartels, abuses and to promote competitive markets. These arrangements constitute what can be termed as « economic sovereignty contracts ». These new types of contracts haven’t been thoughtfully analyzed yet in the scholarship. This paper analyzes the real consideration in these contracts, which is, as defined in Chinese law, « the purpose of realizing certain economic goals ». To encourage a firm to confess or to stop an anticompetitive practise, enforcement agencies may promise a smaller fine, shorter sentences, less restrictive orders, or complete amnesty. In contract law, the mutual consideration is not only the different promises between the parties. It’s the operation as a whole, which is the organization or planning of the economic power as a result of a merger or a reinforcement of private firms’ power under the control of agencies, in accordance with economic public policy rules. Public economic rules may change in light of political concerns. Formally, States are sovereign. Substantially, they may choose to surrender part of their sovereignty ; in the case of arbitration for instance. A part from these new economic contracts, leniency programs and commitments have a relative efficiency. With regard to these contracts, the question arises as to whether they are legally and fully binding. What can first be noticed is how important time and a proper enforcement mechanism are important in these types of contracts. Often, indeed, remedies proposed by firms to agencies need to be monitored ; by a trustee for instance. Furthermore the enforcement mechanism used in these kinds of contract (trust or reciprocity) has an impact of the likelihood of their success. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | confiance |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | programmes de clémence |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | régulation |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | engagements |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | contrat de souveraineté |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | contrat économique |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | temps et contrat |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | droit de la concurrence |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | reliance |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | regulation |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | trust |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | commitments |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | leniency programs |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | competition law |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | economic contract |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | sovereignty contract |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | time and contract |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue internationale de droit économique | t.XXIV | 3 | 2011-01-04 | p. 271-296 | 1010-8831 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-droit-economique-2010-3-page-271?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-droit-economique-2010-3-page-271?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
Pas d'exemplaire disponible.
Réseaux sociaux