Le délinquant d’entreprise comme bouc émissaire (notice n° 874634)
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| fixed length control field | 03858cam a2200313 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250123160851.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Garrett, Brandon L. |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Le délinquant d’entreprise comme bouc émissaire |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2016.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 61 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Le Département de la Justice prétend que l’entreprise n’est pas un bouc émissaire, car la priorité est de poursuivre les individus coupables et non les entités artificielles. Mais, comme nous le démontrerons dans cette étude empirique, quand les plus grandes entreprises règlent une affaire pénale fédérale, aucun individu n’est accusé la plupart du temps. L’entreprise apparaît comme une sorte de bouc émissaire qu’il est impossible de placer physiquement en détention, mais susceptible de recevoir un blâme ou une sanction tandis que les individus coupables demeurent libres. Dans cet article, nous développerons des données empiriques originales détaillant le parcours des poursuites individuelles accompagnant les accords de poursuites fédérales des entreprises. Les résultats illustrent les défis posés par la complexité organisationnelle des entreprises qui contribue à obscurcir les fautes. Contrairement à ce que d’illustres critiques appellent de leurs vœux, nous démontrerons que poursuivre davantage les individus ne peut pas se substituer aux poursuites des entreprises. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | A corporation is no scapegoat, assures the Department of Justice, because the first priority is to prosecute culpable individuals and not artificial entities. Yet, as I document in this empirical study, far more often than not, when the largest corporations settle federal criminal cases, no individuals are charged. High profile failures to prosecute executives in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis have only made the problem more urgent. The corporation appears to be a kind of a scapegoat : impossible to physically jail, but capable of receiving blame and punishment while individual culprits go free. In this Article, I develop original empirical data detailing the path of individual prosecutions accompanying federal corporate prosecution agreements. Only 34 percent of federal corporate deferred and non-prosecution agreements from 2001-2014 were accompanied by charges against individuals. Those prosecutions produced uneven results. Only 42 percent of those charged received any jail time. There were large numbers of outright losses : 15 percent terminated in acquittals or dismissals. Only a handful of the cases involved high-level executives. These findings illustrate the challenges posed by organizational complexity and the manner in which it can obscure fault. Contrary to the calls of prominent critics, I argue that bringing more individual criminal cases cannot adequately substitute for prosecuting companies. Instead, corporate prosecutions should be leveraged to enhance individual accountability. In conclusion, I propose statutory, sentencing, and policy changes to tighten the connection between individual and corporate accountability or crimes. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | poursuites individuelles |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Département de la Justice |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | délinquance en col blanc |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | délinquance d’entreprise |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | accords de poursuites différées |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | accords de non-poursuite |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | individual prosecutions |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | deferred prosecution agreements |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | non-prosecution agreements |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | corporate crime |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Department of Justice |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | white-collar crime |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue internationale de droit économique | t. XXX | 2 | 2016-06-24 | p. 239-279 | 1010-8831 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-droit-economique-2016-2-page-239?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-droit-economique-2016-2-page-239?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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