1979, l’entrée des Soviétiques en Afghanistan : des hypothèses de planification contrariées (notice n° 998393)
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fixed length control field | 03142cam a2200253 4500500 |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
control field | 20250125133240.0 |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
Authentication code | dc |
100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
Personal name | Sidos, Philippe |
Relator term | author |
245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
Title | 1979, l’entrée des Soviétiques en Afghanistan : des hypothèses de planification contrariées |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2016.<br/> |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
General note | 44 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | L’intervention militaire soviétique de 1979 en Afghanistan fait suite à une longue politique de coopération et d’influence. L’intention initiale était en 1979 de subjuguer l’opposition armée pour soutenir le gouvernement d’inspiration communiste mais les forces d’intervention se virent engagées progressivement dans une guerre civile. La direction politique et militaire disposait de tous les éléments d’analyse mais l’erreur majeure commise dans les travaux de planification politique fut de sous-estimer la capacité de résistance des moudjahidines. Mais surtout Moscou ne mesura pas l’ampleur de l’opposition constante et résolue des États-Unis et du monde musulman. Malgré la mise en œuvre de méthodes éprouvées de contre-insurrection, le pouvoir soviétique imposa à son armée de conduire un affrontement malgré ses réticences et ses propositions. Si l’intention initiale était de stabiliser le pays et de permettre au gouvernement afghan de rétablir ses forces de sécurité, cet objectif ne fut que partiellement et difficilement atteint, car il ne fut jamais possible d’atteindre le sanctuaire politique et militaire pakistanais. |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
Summary, etc. | The Soviet military intervention of 1979 in Afghanistan could appear as the consequence of a long policy of influence and cooperation. The initial intent in 1979 was to subjugate the armed opposition to support the communist inspired government but the forces of intervention were progresssively dragged into a civil war. The political and military leadership owned all the necessary elements to analyze the real facts and the effective situation but the major mistake during the political planning was to underestimate the capacity of resistance of the Mujahidin. But above all, Moscow did not correctly assess the extent of a constant and resolute opposition coming from the United States and from the Muslim world. Despite the implementation of efficient methods of counter insurrection, the Soviet leadership forced its military forces to conduct an armed conflict despite its reluctance and evolving proposals. If the initial intent was to stabilize the country and allow the government to reestablish its security forces, that aim was only partially and painfully reached, because it was never possible to target the Pakistani political and military sanctuary. |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Afghanistan |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | processus de planification |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | erreurs |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | analyses |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Direction politique et militaire |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | interprétations |
690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element | intervention militaire soviétique |
786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
Note | Stratégique | 113 | 3 | 2016-12-20 | p. 55-84 | 0224-0424 |
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-strategique-2016-3-page-55?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-strategique-2016-3-page-55?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
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