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On reproche communément à Platon de pécher par intellectualisme en faisant des croyances comme des actions irrationnelles le résultat toujours involontaire de l’ignorance du vrai ou du bien : nul ne serait jamais méchant volontairement, ni ne pourrait croire le faux en le sachant tel. La conséquence, difficilement recevable, serait l’impossibilité de mal agir à dessein, ou, ce qui pourrait être plus aisément concevable, de se persuader de choses fausses. On propose de corriger cette lecture caricaturale de Platon, en montrant que, loin de nier la possibilité des croyances ou actions irrationnelles, il fournit au contraire les moyens de les penser.

An objection often levelled at Plato amounts to charging him with intellectualism, blaming him for considering irrational beliefs and actions as the involuntary result of an ignorance regarding what is true or what is good: accordingly, no one could do wrong willingly, nor believe what is false knowingly. This would result in the view, quite problematic indeed, that it would prove impossible to act wrongly on purpose or, what might appear easier to imagine, to persuade oneself of false things. This paper intends to correct this distorted reading of Plato, by showing that, far from refusing the very possibility of irrational beliefs or actions, he offers, on the contrary, the very means to conceive them.