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With €18 billion in public expenditure, individual housing benefits account for almost half of the budget for housing policies in France. The effectiveness of this aid has, however, been called into question by a series of empirical studies showing that the majority of it is captured by owners in the form of higher rents. In addition, the interaction of housing benefits with other social benefits strongly reduces work incentives for low-income households. To address these criticisms, we used TAXIPP, the French tax and benefit microsimulation model, to design a reform scenario aimed at restoring the effectiveness of this social policy. We propose combining individual housing benefits with other household assistance measures, in particular the Revenu de solidarité active (RSA – social inclusion benefit) and the Prime pour l’emploi (PPE – earned income tax credit). While respecting the budgetary constraints of the current system, such a reform would considerably simplify the complex architecture of social benefits, reduce the capture of public aid by owners and preserve the gains of a return to paid work while inducing very limited redistributive effects.