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Many models of the phenomenology of near-death experiences (NDEs) competed with each other in the 1980s, and there is still no consensus on the current model. Since the first observations at the end of the nineteenth century, emphasis has been placed on the heterogeneity of the processes present in the NDEs, which were successively interpreted as the result of dissociation (Sollier), a split (Pfister), a cleavage (Ferenczi), or depersonalization (Noyes and Kletti). We propose a psychodynamic model in which NDEs involve a disjunction of usually interconnected processes, which results in two products: a “disembodied consciousness” and a “hyperembodied consciousness.” This double subjective experience, experienced simultaneously or successively by the subjects, seems to account for all the anomalies of the mind-body relationship that manifest themselves in NDEs. On the basis of this model, we offer a critique of Greyson’s scale, which primarily identifies the subjective experience of disembodied consciousness and thus seems to lack validity.