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After a decade of affirming the idea that military history has been disrupted by information technology developments—according to the theory of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and its extension, the Transformation concept—, the United States defense community had to face, after a long war, a telling new name, the “war on terror,” a brutal delusion on the unwarranted expectations of the RMA, which promised a near-complete and integral view of the “battlefield.” A generation of officers, convinced of the unlimited potential of Western technology, had to face perennial military problems for which they, and their organization, were unprepared. A more pragmatic view of the necessary doctrinal and organizational needs is now prevailing. But Western armies, including the French armed forces, failed to take heed of this “counterrevolution in military affairs.” It is all the more regrettable that the lessons learned by the US military actually emphasize the traditional, engrained qualities of the French soldiers: humanism, the ability to put the role of the military within a broader context, and a common sense based on an emphasis on general knowledge and culture in the education of soldiers and officers. It is thus high time to realize the modernity of our military culture, and to share it with our allies, rather than to follow the path of their unfulfilled expectations.