Realism and criticism of materialism in the Thomistic theory of knowledge
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In his epistemology, Thomas Aquinas defends a intermediary position, between Platonism, on the one hand, and the reductionism of the pre-platonic philosophers, for which all is body, on the other. In opposition to the latter, he claimed that the intellect, the ability to grasp the abstract natures of all things, is by nature different from the body, and counter to Platonism, he claimed that all the human knowledge has a tangible point of departure and that imagination is crucial for the constitution of abstract thought. This article examines the reasons behind Aquinas’s departure from classical “materialism” in order to preserve the specific characteristics of intellectual thought while preserving the role of sensory images and imagination in cognitive activities. In doing so, our attention is brought back to a central thesis concerning the role of the body, Thomistic anthropology.
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