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In this second article on hypnosis, we leave aside explanatory theories to focus on the in-depth understanding of the hypnotic process, and more precisely on the phenomenology of this practice, that is, hypnosis as experience. This field has been marked by three great figures: Jung, Erickson, and Roustang. The first by his conception of human thought and use of self-hypnosis, the second by his atheoretical and pragmatic approach, the last by his sense of incarnation and synthesis and by his proposal to make hypnosis a way of life. In François Roustang’s description of “perceptude” and “generalized wakefulness,” hypnosis appears to be closely related to both the life of the infant and the phenomenological thought of the epoché (Husserl). But more significantly, Roustang was influenced by Heideggerian philosophy and oriental thought, which gives hypnosis the meaning of a philosophy. Finally, we propose that the phenomenological analysis of conscious experience requires a hypnotic mode of consciousness and that it is also possible to develop a phenomenological hypnosis.