Preferences for Redistribution in Europe: Social Inequality, Welfare State, and Tax Provisions
Type de matériel :
93
The classical model proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) defends the idea that, overall, an increase in inequality translates into a greater demand for redistribution. They contrast this with institutionalist points of view that, according to them, link preferences for redistribution to the principals of solidarity at the base of each of the models of the welfare state. Empirical evidence for one side or the other of this debate, however, is inconclusive. This study makes use of a multi-level methodology that takes both individual and collective factors into account to explain preferential choices in favor of redistribution. The results show that individual preferences for redistribution depend both on individual factors such as social class and opinions concerning the origins of wealth, and on national factors such as the degree of existing inequality and the pressure of direct taxation. The explanation lies in the fact that the upper-middle classes are disposed to accept a greater level of redistribution if this is not accompanied by an increase in direct fiscal pressure.
Réseaux sociaux