Constitutional change and duration in power in Africa: An economic approach
Type de matériel :
94
This paper empirically analyzes constitutional change in Africa, focusing on changing the article that limits the number of mandates of the president of the republic. The analysis distinguishes between the attempt to change the article and success in doing so. The analysis is performed on a sample of thirty-two countries and covers the period 1990–2010. Our results obtained from the estimations of biprobit, logit, and relogit models show that (i) the personality of the president, the quality of the political system, and sociocultural and economic factors are the main determinants that motivate the decision to amend the article and ensure its success; (ii) the legal origin of the law is an obstacle to constitutional change; and (iii) the political opposition hinders change when it is not strongly polarized, but serves the interests of the dominant political group when it is weak and highly fragmented. JEL classification: H11, K10, P48
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