The economics of national representation and the remuneration of French parliamentarians
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In this contribution, we have gathered data on the French Parliament and French parliamentarians in order to enhance our understanding of their different missions (law-making, representation, and monitoring activities). The analysis of data on the number, characteristics, and activities of representatives on the one hand, and that of the data on the budgets of the assemblies on the other, display a number of different changes. First, the representatives benefit from a generous pension system, but their base salary has declined in real terms, while other elements (such as expenditure allowances to cover expenses that arise in the course of their parliamentary activities) of their compensation package have increased. Second, the French National Assembly shows great stability in terms of a weak representativeness and a long-lasting multiple-office holding practice. Finally, parliamentary activity has increased. These evolutions shed light on selection issues as well as the incentive to work—issues that matter for the functioning of representative democracies.
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