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Based on semi-directive interviews with 50 currents Algerian member of Parliament in service, the aim of this article is to build a few hypotheses for a sociology of political representation of June 1997 election. In this analytical framework, it seeks to show that beneath the broken off political game that was central to these elections, there is a social game in which individuals and social groups, party machines, local and central authorities, formal and informal bodies, intermediaries and election brokers carry out a transaction, a social and symbolic exchange over electoral supply, in the melting pot of clientelist relations. The article seeks to prove that much of the parties’ capture of the parliamentarians and their election depends on social capital and/or the art of the mobilization of the primordial links. Caught in relations of « reciprocal predation » between State and society that are expressed in the repertory of political clientelism, the Algerian deputies thus become agents of clientelistic mediation.