In Defense of Social Comparison
Type de matériel :
24
Although social comparison theory comprises an extensive literature in social psychology, researchers have recently questioned both its importance and pervasiveness as source for self-evaluation. In this paper, I review some of the arguments and data that have been marshaled to make these claims and show that these arguments can be countered by clarifying Festinger’s initial assumptions and distinguishing between instrumental and social self-evaluation. I review recent evidence that shows that even when comparisons are not made explicitly, implicit social comparisons occur frequently and spontaneously. I also describe studies that show that individual comparisons can override large sample data, and that judgments of one’s own characteristics versus those of an average peer involve assimilation of an average peer toward the self. When all this is considered, I believe that the state of the evidence provides overwhelming support for the faith that social psychologists have had in social comparison’s pervasiveness and importance as a data source for self-evaluation and prediction.
Réseaux sociaux