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Over the last decade, a new type of paternalism has emerged thanks to the groundbreaking works of some behavioral economists. This new type of paternalism, which I refer to here as Behavioral Paternalism (BP), has become popular through Sunstein and Thaler’s “nudge theory” and challenges the view that paternalism is unacceptable today. The aim of this paper is to assess its moral legitimacy (not exclusively focusing on its alleged libertarian nature). The results of my investigation can be summarized as follows. Though BP is usually acknowledged for its “libertarian” character, it does not satisfy the conditions of what is considered, since Feinberg, as “soft paternalism.” Nevertheless, BP has a strong point that has been underestimated by its partisans: it first withstands Anderson’s equality argument. Unlike traditional forms of paternalism, BP is not demeaning and does not ostracize any category of people. Lastly, BP can prove to be genuinely altruistic. This, however, is dependent upon the abandoning of Sunstein and Thaler’s main assumptions.