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The expression “juger les fous” (to judge the insane) though dramatic, is nevertheless somewhat unclear. It certainly has the immense merit of reminding us of some of the foundational principles of modern law and bringing us face to face with them. There can be n° law without “responsibility,” or at least accountability. The law attends to its respondent. But while free will may be subject to measure, it can hardly account for freedom in a given situation, or for the use of freedom not only in a given situation but through the situation, which gives it body, text, context, and puts it in a frame of reference. Far from being the same as free will, this is a personified freedom, with all the ambiguities and ambivalence this personified aspect implies. Is it not in that very sense that the expression “to judge the insane” sheds n° light on the vague, difficult areas where a human freedom struggles within the contexts and determinations - even the determinisms - that make up its story, at the risk of determining it out of existence? Should we not oppose to this the act of judgment as a task of elucidation, instructed by the explanatory sciences, which each time reenacts the comprehension of a responsibility or irresponsibility?