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A definition of political power as both power over and power to prompts a reconsideration of the repertoire of justification on which political legitimacy is built. For a long time the ideal type of Weberian rational-legal legitimacy characterized a method of political domination that was proper to Western states. It is now the target of many critics who regard it as inadequate and unable to account for changes in the political regulation of our contemporary societies. In a period of erosion of state power, law and bureaucracy, which were at the heart of the Weberian model, have lost their centrality. Not only do these criticisms not take into account Weberian analysis of political responsibility, which shows that legitimacy must be thought of in terms of the exercise of power, but empirical studies do not demonstrate either the end of the bureaucratic mode of organization or the irreversible decline of the place of law in the management of public affairs. A deeper reflection on political legitimacy leads more to an renewal of the Weberian model than a simple renunciation of it.