Reid's Naturalist Critique of Hume's Skepticism
Type de matériel :
TexteLangue : français Détails de publication : 2015.
Sujet(s) : Ressources en ligne : Abrégé : This paper shows how irrepressible belief is sufficient for Reid to repudiate Hume’s doubts concerning perception and induction. Distinguishing between psychological descriptive naturalism and epistemological normative naturalism, the paper shows how Humean naturalism can be skeptical while Reid’s naturalism counters skepticism. It advocates the idea that Reid’s naturalist critique of skepticism has a purely epistemological side, independent of any metaphysical assumption.
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This paper shows how irrepressible belief is sufficient for Reid to repudiate Hume’s doubts concerning perception and induction. Distinguishing between psychological descriptive naturalism and epistemological normative naturalism, the paper shows how Humean naturalism can be skeptical while Reid’s naturalism counters skepticism. It advocates the idea that Reid’s naturalist critique of skepticism has a purely epistemological side, independent of any metaphysical assumption.
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