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Wilfrid Sellars’s references to Hegel in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind are as famous as they are allusive. Sellars’s followers, in order to fight against the “myth of the given,” have often tried to fill in the gaps of such a reading of Hegel as a “great foe of immediacy.” In this paper, I aim at presenting two significant post-Sellarsian readings of Hegel: Richard Rorty’s and Robert Brandom’s. Rorty’s reading is a “kuhnianization” of Hegel: once his idealism has been set aside, the incarnation of the ironist and historicist narrator of the great shifts of terminology in the Western world, Brandom endorses the core arguments of Hegel’s idealism, when they have been reformulated according to the premises of his inferential pragmatics. In Brandom’s view, rational normativity is to be seen as a set of social practices of inferential commitments and entitlements embedded in relations of recognition. However, neither Rorty nor Brandom is able to articulate successfully the two dimensions whose interdependence has been made explicit by both Hegel and Sellars: the inter-subjective game of asking and giving reasons and the objectivity of social institutions.