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In Books I and II of Periphyseon, Eriugena mentions the “primordial causes” (corresponding to the second species of nature) without specifying any order of priority among them. In response to a question about this posed by the Alumnus, this omission is rectified near the beginning of Book III. Initially, Eriugena follows the authority of Dionysius and argues that, since the divine names in Dionysius’s De Divinis Nominibus correspond to his own primordial causes, he is permitted to adopt the order of the Dionysian treatise. However, Eriugena quickly shifts to rational demonstration. Here, he first establishes certain general principles governing the ordering of the primordial causes. This section of the argument makes extensive use of the analogy of a geometrical sphere in order to argue for the striking conclusion: there is no perceptible order either at the beginning or at the end of the causes’ procession into created things. Such a conclusion is possible because of what one might term the idealistic, non-discursive, and theophanic aspects of Eriugena’s theory. Secondly, Eriugena explains a specific case of the ordering of the primordial causes, and argues that the primordial cause of Goodness precedes the primordial cause of Being. The Alumnus expresses satisfaction with his teacher’s explanation and summarizes what he has learned, although certain features of his summary suggest that he has not grasped the theory’s more subtle features. A postscript to this essay briefly considers the question of whether or not reminiscences of Boethius’s De Consolatione Philosophiae have influenced Eriugena’s discussion of this question.