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This contribution offers an analysis of the problem of categories and the definition of substance in Aristotle in light of the work of the young Brentano. The paper explores the implications of Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics and its concept of reality. The possibility of metaphysics after Kant is formulated either in terms of metaphysics of the subject, in German idealism, or in terms of the metaphysical foundation of natural phenomena. Brentano, by contrast, claims that a new foundation of metaphysics is possible starting from the notion of substance. As metaphysical knowledge must be justified by experience in accordance with empirical method and sciences, Brentano proposes a definition of substance based upon inner experience. The paper suggests that the Brentanian definition of categories, especially substance, as real concepts ( Realbegriffe) involves some connection between Kantianism and Aristotelian tradition. The paper claims that Brentano’s interpretation opens up a new conception of categories: categories as intentional concepts.