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According to the theory of phenomenal knowledge as acquaintance, our knowledge of phenomenal attributes relies on an epistemologically direct and metaphysically simple relation between subjects and their experiential states. In this paper, I argue that the best argument in support of this view is an inference to the best explanation (IBE). After having described the explanandum and the explanans of this inference, I raise two problems that an acquaintance theorist should address. The first problem concerns the explanandum. In order for an IBE not to be explanatorily circular, its explanandum has to be established independently from the theory that it aims at motivating. Here however, I claim that this is not the case. The simplest explanation for the problematic intuitions that are mentioned in the explanandum might very well be that acquaintance theorists have these intuitions because they antecedently believe in the acquaintance view, which would make the theory circular. The second problem concerns the explanans of the IBE. I contend that acquaintance theorists should give an account of what kind of role exactly a non-causal, primitive, acquaintance relation could play in explaining the acquisition of phenomenal beliefs.