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In Hegel’s account of physics, the issue of space presents itself as a deeply interesting viewpoint. Space is indeed a thematic object in physics, but it is quite impossible to see it as an “object” as such. It is a dimension, the definition of which leads to a reflection on the relationship between the scientific discourse, its object, and its method. In this article, I intend to show that the so-called “confrontation” between Hegel and Newton about space must be understood as follows: Hegel took seriously the methodological nature of the hypothesis of an absolute space. The specification of this methodological nature gives way to the exposition of its implicit metaphysics. However, in Hegel’s view, Newton’s implicit metaphysics is based on a mathematics-based ontology. On the basis of the critique of mathematics’ implicit paradigmatic status, Hegel then provides a theory of space as an “ideality.” In such a theory, Hegel presents a new understanding of space, freed from the misleading spontaneous transposition between the field of methodological requirements and the field of being.