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The paper focuses on the relationship between phronesis (practical wisdom) and ethical virtue in the Aristotelian conception of action and happiness. The main issue is the following: should we think, according to a “Humean” conception, that, in Aristotle, goals are set by our desire, while reason serves as a mere instrument to find out the means to achieve them? The claim is that the virtue of character does give the content of goals, but this does not lead to relegating the phronesis to the rank of a mere instrument. Indeed, phronesis is excellence in deliberation about things for the sake of an end. It allows us to understand what it means to have an end. To show this, the author proceeds by examining deliberative and demonstrative syllogisms, both of which are explanatory arguments. This comparison allows the author to show that ethical virtue gives the “whats” (“what to do”), whereas phronesis allows us to understand the “whys”, i.e., for the sake of what end the action must be done. Complete virtue implies having a grasp of the “whys”; for this reason, phronesis is ethically significant and is necessary for happiness.