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Is there a tension between Émilie du Châtelet’s Law of Continuity (LC) and her belief that there is a difference in kind between absolutely certain and morally certain propositions? In this paper, I argue that no, there is no tension, since there are at least two interpretative choices that commentators can make. First, they could argue that for du Châtelet, the LC should be applied in the empirical domain only: there is an epistemic gap between the natural, empirical world from which we achieve morally certain truths, and the abstract, metaphysical world from which we achieve absolutely certain truths. The other alternative, which I defend here, is the following: to interpret du Châtelet as believing in an epistemological formulation of the LC, in which case (i) there is no difference in kind between absolutely certain and morally certain propositions, and (ii) the domain of the PSR is all truths, even absolutely certain truths—contra the positions of Brading (2019), Detlefsen (2014), and Wells (forthcoming). This resolves the tension since it means that du Châtelet is not committed—strictly speaking—to a difference in kind between absolutely and morally certain truths, so it is consistent with an epistemological formulation of the LC (as there would be no leaps or gaps between one and the other). According to this interpretation, it is in principle possible for morally certain truths to become absolutely certain truths, once the Principle of Contradiction (PC) or God is the sufficient reason for why the former are in fact absolutely certain.