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The fact/value distinction has been a fundamental element in Anglo-Saxon philosophy since at least Hume. Two centuries later, Wittgenstein must have had something similar in mind when he claimed, in the Tractatus, that value does not reside in the world (6.4 – 6.421), a claim that inspired him to conclude that “Ethics and æsthetics are one.” The fact/value distinction was also defended and reinforced by aesthetic theorists such as C.L. Stevenson and I.A. Richards. During the same period, however, Marxist thinkers were developing arguments totally opposed to this traditional position, arguments that led to what could be called a “principle of non-neutrality.” According to this principle, no work of art can be socially or politically neutral, for it necessarily plays some role in the political context. This principle can be linked to the notion of narrativity, as can be shown via an examination of a few contemporary artists (including François Morellet and Anthony Braxton). But if the principle of non-neutrality seems to invalidate any absolute separation between facts and values in the sphere of aesthetics, it does not justify Putnam’s total rejection of the distinction.