Gas Release as a Short Term Instrument to Foster Competition
Type de matériel :
TexteLangue : français Détails de publication : 2008.
Ressources en ligne : Abrégé : This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the “artificial” duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted. Classification JEL: L51, L95
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This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the “artificial” duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted. Classification JEL: L51, L95
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