The Bank Capital Channel and Counter-Cyclical Prudential Regulation in a DSGE Model
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The aim of this paper is to present a model for the bank capital channel (BCC) in the theoretical structure proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999). In the context of costly profit verifications, banks are charged a financing premium on their external funds, which depends on the structure of their balance sheets, and which then fluctuates in a counter-cyclical way. This premium is then passed on as higher lending costs to businesses. Simulations confirm that shocks are more amplified than in the BGG model, and confirm the importance of the financial context for macroeconomic volatility. Given the effects of this channel and the ineffectiveness of monetary policy in a capital crunch context, the model enables a conclusive assessment of the advantages associated with a preemptive and counter-cyclical prudential measure in a dynamic general equilibrium model.
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