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Taking as its starting point the ruling by the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) on the Maastricht Treaty, this article deals with the conditions under which a form of “counter-knowledge” of European integration was formally developed. While they have so far received less attention than the justices of the European Court of Justice – who are popular subjects for political and sociological studies on European integration – German FCC judges nonetheless appear to possess a specific authority and influence on European politics. In this regard, the so-called “Maastricht decision” represents a seminal moment, which many commentators have interpreted as reflecting a sovereignist perspective that is inherently hostile towards European integration. Distancing itself from this reading, however, this article demonstrates that this decision cannot be satisfyingly explained without taking into account the struggles amongst jurists and public law scholars vying for a monopoly on constitutional interpretation. Analysing the constitutional controversy surrounding the Maastricht Treaty, this article shows how a specific group of law professors succeeded in imposing constitutional law as the dominant form of political knowledge.