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An important stake which appears in any realism consists in articulating the notion of the real according to three types of relations: metaphysical, epistemic and doxastic. In order to account for these three relations while maintaining its own originality consisting in opposing the real to the doubles, Rosset’s ontological theory has taken the form of a set of principles which have evolved through his works. In what follows, I propose to describe this development and to critically examine it (section 1). Next, I pass to the question of discussing the inconsistency objections addressed to Rosset’s ontology (section 2) and then, of situating the question of doubles with fictions (section 3). Finally, I compare the function of doubles with the attitudes of make-believe (section 4). My conclusion insists on the importance of maintaining a philosophy of the double which, on the one hand, affirms the authenticity of the real, in other words which challenges both ontological anti-realism and unrealism and which, on the other hand, refuses the ontological content of the doubles. There are no ontological doubles, not even proximity doubles; there are only epistemic doubles.