95

In his Moralia, James Almain (ca. 1480-1515) asks a question concerning the foundation of moral prohibitions: Is every sin a sin because it is prohibited? Almain judges as most probable the opinion of the masters who claimed that there are intrinsically evil acts, that is, those which not even God can render possible for a human being to perform without sinning. To expound this view, he takes up the thesis by Gregory of Rimini according to which there are “indicative prohibitions,” which are based upon right reason and which proscribe sinful actions in a necessary way, in addition to “imperative prohibitions,” which are essentially contingent and which are less fundamental than the indicative prohibitions. But Almain’s reading of Gregory places the legislative activity of right reason at the center of the metaethical analysis of these necessary prohibitions. Right reason seems to be perfectly sovereign, as its judgements do not seem to be founded upon any objectivity that would be antecedent to the judgment itself. Thus he anticipates in certain respects the Kantian revolution.