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Spanning the period from the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 to the 1980 coup d’État, this article puts forth the hypothesis that although the army had important means of coercion and action at its disposal, thus granting it a supra-social status, it often lacked internal cohesion. Its interventions, both direct and indirect, were reactions to crises, which they often exacerbated but did not always control. Although there is no doubt that the army possessed an “esprit de corps”, a common nationalist and Kemalist ideology, as well as a minimum of organic unity, it nevertheless did not manage to derive its legitimacy from an exclusive supra-social position. Consequently, it had to interact with State and civil society actors. Its technology of power was designed according to the interests and expectations of the officers who wielded it, the constraints and opportunities they faced, as well as the subjective perceptions that they had regarding various political problems.