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The Romanian Constitution of 1866 introduced the incompatibility between publicly remunerated functions and holding an elected office. While the payment of allowances or donations was expressly prohibited in the case of senators, the constitutional text did not include a similar provision for the members of the lower chamber. However, in the Romanian case, the compensation for parliamentary work was not a sign of political professionalization in the Weberian sense. The political elite remained closed at the end of the 19th century and beyond. This trend continued, despite attempts to clarify the MPs’ status and the expansion of the suffrage. Legislative restrictions regarding conflicts of interest or incompatibilities became disciplinary tools in the hands of party leaders, and not instruments of achieving transparency or empowerment of the political sphere. The article focuses on the remuneration of parliamentary work in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, describing both the benefits and the legislative constraints that weighed on elected officials. In my argument, the remuneration of elected officials was neither aimed at greater inclusiveness in the candidate selection process, nor at the professionalization of the actors. Conversely, public financing became a “systemic” financial device embedded in a broader process of political institutionalisation.