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Psychologists have intensively studied pointing gestures in both human and non-human primates. This research has aimed to understand the emergence of pointing during ontogeny and phylogeny, since human infants develop pointing behaviors before speaking, and non-human primates use pointing or “pointing-like gestures” but do not (yet) speak. However, pointing in non-humans remains controversial. In this regard, Tomasello (2006) wrote “ Why Don’t Apes Point?,” arguing that non-human pointing may not encapsulate the same functional and cognitive properties as human pointing. However, empirical studies on non-human primates’ gestural communication have led to remarkable results that once again call into question this claim for human uniqueness. In this article, I use a series of empirical studies conducted on olive baboons ( Papio anubis) to illustrate this issue of pointing gestures in monkeys. I emphasize the communicative function and intentional properties of such gestures, as well as the cognitive skills required for their use. These studies show that monkeys flexibly tailor their gestural communication to the attentional status of their audience, and exhibit persistence, targeted attention, and an ability to develop their communicative means. However, findings bearing on the acquisition of these skills emphasize the importance of the context within which gesturing develops: only monkeys that learn to gesture towards an attentive and responsive human eventually develop skills for intentional communication closely similar to our own. These results are discussed in terms of operational criteria that may be relevant to the study of intentional communication, and in relation to the conceptual postures of lean and rich interpretations in comparative psychology.