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RésuméOn a hésité en Occident à prendre la mesure des programmes d’armes biologiques soviétiques. Ils témoignent pourtant d’une volonté explicite de ne pas respecter la convention d’interdiction, et d’une conception militaire de leur utilisation. Les incertitudes demeurent sur la survivance de tels programmes en Russie. L’héritage soviétique pose plus généralement la question du fonctionnement des dispositifs d’ arms control, et de la diffusion d’éléments d’armements biologiques à des entités terroristes.

The scope, sophistication, and ambition of the biological weapons programs of the Soviet Union were dramatic. Yet they were largely unknown outside secret circles in Moscow. In the early 1990s, Russian President Boris Yeltsin revealed the existence of these Soviet-vintage programs — and acknowledged his lack of success in closing them down. This experience is rich in lessons for Western security specialists. It is a reminder of the sometimes significant gap between perceptions and reality with regard to secret military programs. It illustrates the potential military utility of biological weapons as well as the potential impact of biotechnology on the BW threat. This experience also illustrates the limited success of arms control in dealing with especially willful violators. Russia’s current biological warfare activities remain a subject of concern.