Cortés-Cuadra <br/><br/>
Reason, passions and conatus in Spinoza. A brief archeology of suicide 

 -  2017.<br/>							 
<br/><br/> 47 
<br/><br/> From an examination of Spinoza’s difficulties in explaining the fact of “suicide,” this article intends to take the first steps towards an archeology of philosophical discourse on suicide. Starting from a “vulgar” definition of suicide as a voluntary act by which one endeavors to put an end to one’s own existence, we are forced to admit that for Spinoza there can be no “suicide” in the strict sense. In other words, it is ontologically impossible to act in any way to effect one’s own annihilation. Therefore, the determination to such an act must necessarily involve an external cause by which it can also be explained. It remains to be seen, however, whether the three cases Spinoza uses to exemplify his explanation actually account for such an extrinsic determination (E IV 20 S). Now, we believe that such is not the case and that they all imply a certain paradox. This is also why, in order to clarify Spinoza’s theses, we have tried to restore his position within the field of presence that was his, specifically, by a reading of the Dutch philosopher Adriaan Heereboord and of the Spanish theologian Juan Caramuel. By this we have seen that the moral question of suicide becomes a question of political legitimacy. In Spinoza, the question of suicide is also dependent on an implicit political questioning. We have treated it by the barely sketched figure of the hanged man (E II 49 S).