TY  - BOOK
AU  - Fleckinger,Pierre
AU  -  Lafay,Thierry
TI  - Catalog Competition in Hotel Duopoly
PY  - 2006///.
							
N1  - 12
N2  - We study a duopoly on a market with horizontal differentiation where firms compete in catalog: firms choose a price and a location in the consumer’ space. Whereas there is no equilibrium in pure strategy for the simultaneous game, we show that an equilibrium always exists in a sequential competition. In this subgame perfect equilibrium the leader chooses a more specific product at a lower price than the follower. Thus the leader earns finally less than the follower. This introduces a tension between the temptation of attrition, which leads to an unstable configuration, and the will to guarantee a stricly positive profit. Classification JEL : L11, H41, D43, M3
UR  - https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2006-3-page-573?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
ER  -