TY  - BOOK
AU  - Martimort,David
AU  -  Sand-Zantman,Wilfried
TI  - Environmental Agreements
PY  - 2014///.
							
N1  - 52
N2  - This article proposes a perspective on international climate agreements, based on mechanism design. We exhibit a trade-off between incentives and participation. We derive a general condition under which the first-best allocation can be implemented. We then discuss how this condition is affected by the assumptions on the status quo, in particular whether a non-cooperative or a grandfathering solution prevails when the negotiation fails. We show that, when the feasibility condition is satisfied, a market-based solution can indeed implement the first best allocation. At last, when the condition does not hold, we characterize the main properties of the second-best solution. Classification JEL : Q54 ; D82 ; D62
UR  - https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2014-4-page-481?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
ER  -