TY  - BOOK
AU  - Festré,Agnès
AU  -  Kirakozian,Ankinée
AU  -  Toumi,Mira
TI  - Threat, sanction or advice? Prosocials vs. individualists: Which incentive for whom?
PY  - 2019///.
							
N1  - 15
N2  - In this article we investigate and compare the effect of a collective sanction (namely, an increase of the tax burden) with a recommendation, both from a third-party, in a public good game “à la Andreoni [1993]” where crowding-out is possible. Furthermore, we test for the correlation between the incentives and the social orientation of subjects on cooperation by using a social value orientation (SVO) test. Our results show that, in general, the sanction is more powerful than the recommendation but also that the threat of punishment has a disciplinary impact by enhancing cooperation. Moreover, we show that both sanction and its threat have a different impact according to the social orientation of subjects: contrary to individualists and competitors, prosocials are not significantly sensitive to both. JEL Codes: Q53, C91, D03
UR  - https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2019-6-page-1125?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
ER  -