TY  - BOOK
AU  - Forges,Françoise
TI  - Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information
PY  - 2023///.
							
N1  - 45
N2  - Aumann [1974] introduced the correlated equilibrium as a solution concept for games in strategic form. Aumann [1987] showed that if players are Bayes rational (i.e., maximize their individual expected utility with respect to their beliefs) and share a common prior, their actions follow a correlated equilibrium distribution. Various extensions of the correlated equilibrium have been proposed for games with incomplete information. This paper provides a brief account of them. JEL Codes: C72, D82, D83
UR  - https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2023-4-page-529?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
ER  -