Colin, Bertrand <br/><br/>
Three Brief Observations On the Subject of Françoise Coblence’s Dialogue with the History of Philosophy 

 -  2011.<br/>							 
<br/><br/> 18 
<br/><br/> F. Coblence’s written and oral presentations hold together between three expressions: “Psyche is extended; knows nothing about it”; “Psyche is bodily; knows nothing about it”; “Psyche is bodily; knows it well, but fortunately keeps forgetting it”. The first observation – “Psyche is bodily; knows nothing about it” – characterises the Cartesian turn and results from a first – epistemological – reduction, defining the object of the science. A second, ontological, reduction, is its correlate. The second observation is that the Cartesian ego is also bodily and is therefore “split”, just like the “divided” and conflictual Freudian ego. The third observation – “Psyche is bodily; knows nothing about it” – is an expression that is perfectly consistent with a third, phenomenological, reduction, as defined by Husserl. This third reduction stems from a reinterpretation of the Cartesian ego, with the detour through Aristotle’s concept of “touch”. One consequence of these “reductions”, all three of which are rooted in the Cartesian turn, is the prevention of any totalising or holistic approach. “Psyche is bodily; knows it well, but hastens to forget it” demonstrates this prevention. A “modern” post-Cartesian tension between monism and dualism is the inevitable result of this break with any form of holism. Two contemporary philosophers who are in fact extremely different –M. Gauchet and J.-L. Marion– inspire the essence of these reflections.