TY  - BOOK
AU  - Diamond,Cora
TI  - Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein and what can only be true
PY  - 2022///.
							
N1  - 31
N2  - In An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Elizabeth Anscombe took it to be a fault of the Tractatus that it excluded the statement “‘Someone’ is not the name of someone,” which she took to be obviously true. It is not a bipolar proposition. I examine whether she is right that the Tractatus excludes such propositions, and I consider her example in relation to other propositions which, arguably at least, have no intelligible negation. In considering the particular case of Frege’s response to Benno Kerry about the concept « horse, » I try to develop an account of the place in Wittgenstein’s philosophy for certain sorts of proposition which do not have an intelligible negation
UR  - https://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-internationale-de-philosophie-2022-2-page-15?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
ER  -