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The article analyzes two public policies implemented to reduce post-harvest food losses: the first based on a minimum logistics standard (MLS) imposed on producers and the second based on subsidizing producer logistics. We propose a model of spatial differentiation in which producers of perishable products are geographically located and at varying distances from a wholesale market. We assess different effects of these policies: direct effects (on food losses) and “collateral” effects (on prices and on the exclusion of producers). In a situation without public intervention, the imposition of an MLS only improves the infrastructure of the producers closest to the market, while a public subsidy is more effective at improving the infrastructure of producers farthest from the market. We show that public authorities may face a dilemma: i) choose an MLS that is more efficient at reducing the risk of food loss but with more negative effects on the inclusion of producers and on social well-being; ii) choose a subsidy policy that is less effective at reducing food losses but (if the level is not too high) with more positive externalities for the other criteria. JEL codes: L11, R39, C61, D21